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B
efore  1987  Canada  relied  on  the  early 
appearance of generic drugs, via the compulsory li-
censing section of the Patent Act, to generate price 
competition and keep the prices of prescription medica-
tions affordable. The federal government began to abolish 
compulsory licensing with the signing of the Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States in 1987 and complet-
ed the task in 1993 following the adoption of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
In  place  of  compulsory  licensing  the  government 
amended the Patent Act to establish the Patented Medi-
cine  Prices  Review  Board  (PMPRB),  which  continues 
along the path of using a drug’s patent status as a meth-
od of controlling prices. In the process Canada became 
the only country in the world to directly consider patent 
status as the basis for price regulation. Other countries 
have adopted a variety of other mechanisms for price 
control. At one extreme there is the United States, where 
Medicaid and the Veterans Administration require price 
discounts but otherwise prices are negotiated individ-
ually by pharmacy benefit managers and generic prices 
are determined by the discounts obtained through the 
buying power of pharmacy chains and pharmacy buying 
groups. The French system relies on an initial determin-
ation of the therapeutic value of the drug by the Haute 
Autorité de Santé. Then, depending on how beneficial 
the  drug  is,  the  Comité  Economique  des  Produits  de 
Santé allows companies to price it freely within reason-
able boundaries (drugs with greater therapeutic value) 
or negotiates a price as well as a price-volume agreement 
(drugs  with  lesser  therapeutic  value).  Generic  drugs 
enter the market at a 40% discount or their prices are 
negotiated  individually  with  the  Comité.1  The  United 
Kingdom allows companies to set prices for their brand 
name drugs provided overall company profits are within 
40% of a target that is negotiated between the Depart-
ment of Health and individual companies. Companies 
do not set prices in isolation but adopt a pricing strategy 
for their entire range of products.2 Similarly, compan-
ies marketing generic drugs are allowed to set their own 
prices provided they do not exceed the price of the brand 
name product.3 
In  Canada,  once  a  medicine  receives  a  patent  the 
PMPRB has jurisdiction over its price, and that jurisdic-
tion is lost only when the patent expires. Because generic 
drugs are not patented the PMPRB has no authority to 
regulate their prices. The PMPRB exercises its authority 
by subjecting each new patented medicine that is mar-
keted to a series of pricing tests to determine whether 
the introductory price exceeds the price allowed under 
the board’s regulations. In addition, while the product re-
mains under patent the board also limits the rate at which 
the price can rise to roughly the rate of inflation.4
Companies do not always consider it necessary to ob-
tain a patent before they market a drug, and each year a 
number of products are sold before they have received a 
patent; their prices, therefore, are by definition outside 
the authority of the PMPRB. As a consequence, compan-
ies have the freedom to set their own prices, although if 
prices are considered too high and less expensive equiva-
lent products are available, the drugs may be rejected for 
listing on provincial drug formularies. 
In Canada, authority to market a drug is termed a No-
tice of Compliance (NOC). Health Canada maintains a 
searchable online listing (http://205.193.93.51/NocWeb/
nocqrye.jsp) of when drugs received their NOC. By draw-
ing on the NOC database, annual PMPRB reports and a 
database listing when drug patents were applied for and 
granted (http://www.patentregister.ca/), it is possible to 
construct a list of drugs that were marketed before being 
patented over the period 2000–2008. Open Medicine 2010;4(3):e140
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Over the 9 years a total of 192 new active substan-
ces (drug molecules that had never been sold before in 
Canada in any form) were introduced into the Canadian 
market, and 42 (22%) of these had no patent at the time 
they were first sold. Of these 42 drugs, 9 were excluded 
from  further  analysis  because  of  inconsistencies  be-
tween the 3 data sources. Table 1 lists all 33 drugs in-
cluded in the analysis, along with the dates when they 
received an NOC and a first patent. Drugs were poten-
tially being marketed between 54 and 2707 days before 
they came under PMPRB jurisdiction. (Table 1 gives the 
maximum period, as companies may choose to market 
a drug at some point after it receives an NOC.) One may 
have been on the market for over 7.4 years before being 
patented, and 12 may have been on the market for over 
3 years before being patented. The time between patent 
application and receipt ranged from 1531 to 7096 days 
(data available on request). 
Once  the  drug  receives  a  patent  of  any  sort,  the 
PMPRB gains control over the pricing of the drug and 
reviews its price from the time it was initially marketed. 
If the price during the period between marketing and 
patenting is found to be excessive, the PMPRB calcu-
lates the excess revenue the company earned on the drug 
until the patent was granted and can order the company 
to repay the excess revenue to the federal government. 
Of the 33 products, 3 were eventually determined by the 
PMPRB to have exceeded the maximum introductory 
price, and the total excess revenue for these, as record-
ed in the PMPRB annual reports, was $9,289,688. The 
PMPRB is still investigating the price of one product to 
determine if it is excessive.
It is unclear why these drugs were marketed before 
they had a patent. One possibility is undue delay be-
tween when the patent was applied for and when it was 
granted. The mean time for all 33 drugs between the 2 
dates was almost 10 years. Companies may have filed 
for patents later in the life cycle of these drugs than is 
commonly the case, but this would be an internal com-
pany decision without any public record. Whether the 
delay between applying for a patent and receiving one is 
different for drugs marketed before being patented and 
those marketed after being patented is not known. 
Although only 3 of the 33 (9%) drugs were found to 
be overpriced, the fact that prices can go unregulated for 
up to 7.4 years is troublesome. If companies are charging 
excessive prices, then the additional revenue paid to the 
company may limit the ability of provincial formularies 
to list additional drugs. Only 1 of the 3 drugs with an 
excessive price was put on the Ontario Drug Benefit For-
mulary, which may not seem to represent a significant 
problem, but this loophole in the way drug prices are 
regulated needs to be recognized and monitored since 
more instances may occur in the future. 
Although the excess revenue is eventually recovered, 
it is paid to the federal government, not the provincial 
governments, which funded the drug through their drug 
benefit schemes. If drugs are not covered by provincial 
plans, then private insurers and people paying out-of-
pocket are still disadvantaged, and, like the provincial 
plans, they do not recover the excess money they paid 
out. Companies may not ultimately benefit by taking ad-
vantage of this loophole in the PMPRB regulations, but 
all payers suffer negative economic consequences.
Drugs marketed after being patented may also be in-
itially priced excessively, but in these cases the board’s 
authority starts as soon as the drug is being sold and 
therefore  excessive  prices  will  be  recognized  and  re-
duced much earlier. 
This commentary highlights a hitherto undocument-
ed  problem  and  presents  an  additional  argument  for 
moving towards a different method of controlling drug 
prices.  Regulating  drug  prices  based  on  patent  status 
leaves significant gaps in the federal government’s abil-
ity to control overall spending on medications. Brand 
name products whose patents have expired and generic 
drugs are not under federal price controls. Off-patent 
brand name products and generic drugs represented just 
over 35% of total ex-factory sales of $20 billion in 2008.4 
Although provinces may establish rules regarding prices 
for generic drugs, these rules are not uniform from prov-
ince  to  province,  and  some  provinces  may  be  paying 
more for generic drugs than others. Thalidomide, now 
used for the treatment of multiple myeloma, is neither 
approved nor patented in Canada but is available under 
Health Canada’s Special Access Program. The drug costs 
$44,000 for a standard course of treatment as a result of 
the United States distributor raising the price five-fold. 
Since the drug is not patented here the PMPRB is power-
less to prevent such increases.5 
After the PMPRB was created companies attempted 
to  evade  price  controls  by  dedicating  patents.  (Patent 
dedication is essentially a voluntary surrender of the pat-
ent for public use.) Until the PMPRB changed its regula-
tions and stopped this practice in early 1995, companies 
dedicated 449 patents on 136 drug products. At least 43 
of these products were priced above the level allowed by 
the PMPRB, costing Canadian consumers an excess of 
almost $40 million.6 The fact that few drugs have been 
overpriced to date is no indication of what may happen 
in the future. Patent dedication indicates that companies 
do not regard patent status as necessary in all cases in Open Medicine 2010;4(3):e141
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 order to protect their products from generic competition. 
Marketing before patenting may become more common 
in the future.
The best remedy for the various problems associated 
with using patent status to regulate prices is simply to treat 
all drugs on the market equally and regulate all prices.
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